Autumn of Our Discontent: Fall 1949 and the Crises in American National Security by John M. Curatola

Author:John M. Curatola [Curatola, John M.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History, Military, United States, Nuclear Warfare
ISBN: 9781682476215
Google: erJoEAAAQBAJ
Amazon: B09KVBN1XQ
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2022-06-14T18:30:00+00:00

Denfeld’s Demise

As the various organizations and committees were all beginning their deliberations about the future of thermonuclear technology, a bombshell of another kind was developing. Although Representative Vinson’s select committee eventually took no real action regarding the B-36 or provided any definitive guidance on military strategy, there were still consequences over what had occurred before members of Congress during October. Within twenty-four hours of the select committee’s adjournment, speculation about the future of CNO Denfeld was already hitting the newspapers. The interservice tussle that raised so many questions regarding strategic approach, methodology, and the budget was now coming down to discussions over personal loyalty and allegiance.

Although General Bradley’s stinging comments were still fresh in everyone’s mind, the JCS chairman downplayed his pointed testimony—especially the attacks directed at Denfeld. Days later Bradley was called out by House Majority Leader John McCormack (D-MA) to withdraw his statement about the Navy’s “fancy dans” and his attack on Denfeld, calling them “disrespectful.”⁴⁴³ The press also made much out of Bradley’s comments about the admiral’s combat record; when pressed by Hanson Baldwin regarding the general’s thinly veiled disparagement, he replied, “If I made a mistake I am sorry.”⁴⁴⁴ Yet given the tone of his delivery, combined with Bradley’s often abrasive personality, the general probably felt little remorse. Days later both the CNO and JCS chairman attended a meeting together. When asked if the session was “harmonious,” Bradley simply replied, “sure … it was just a normal meeting.”⁴⁴⁵ While he tried to downplay any ill will, the general’s harsh words during his testimony were nothing compared to what was awaiting the CNO after the hearings.

Given his earlier meeting with Fleet Admiral Nimitz in New York on 14 October, Secretary of the Navy Matthews felt confident in his plan to remove Denfeld. With all kinds of speculation swirling around as the hearings closed, days later, on 27 October, the secretary wrote the president asking permission to fire Denfeld. Even though Chairman Vinson specifically directed during the hearings that he would not tolerate any reprisals against witnesses, the removal of the CNO, according to Matthews at least, had already been underway.⁴⁴⁶ As Nimitz suggested, to justify actions taken against the CNO, the Navy Secretary claimed that his confidence in Denfeld had waned even before the hearings commenced. In his three-page letter requesting the CNO’s removal, the Navy Secretary argued that the two men “were [at one time] in complete agreement on all important questions affecting … the Department of the Navy. I felt sure that such a harmonious relationship would continue.”⁴⁴⁷ A few paragraphs later, however, Matthews stated that his relations with Denfeld had “finally become such that I find it increasingly difficult to work with him in the harmonious relationship which should prevail between the occupants of th[ese] two official positions.”⁴⁴⁸ Avoiding any mention of the CNO’s testimony, he asked to “transfer” the admiral to “other important duties.”⁴⁴⁹ Interestingly, the secretary was not relieving the CNO of his duties as a naval officer, just those of his current position.

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